​Manoj Saxena

Introduction

The United States of America holds a prominent position in terms of technological readiness and national competitiveness in the present day. The country also has a long and distinguished history of using Science and Technology (S&T) to achieve its foreign policy and national security objectives. As a country with a world-renowned university education system; a highly advanced innovation environment; a competitive private sector; and a robust legal and executive apparatus the US has consistently maintained a commanding lead over allies and adversaries alike in terms of S&T capability spanning over several decades. A sound economy, effective diplomacy and credible S&T infrastructure has enabled the country to attain a position of influence in multilateral arms control and nonproliferation forums such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and Wassenaar Arrangement. US universities and private sector technology organizations have also contributed greatly to the country's considerable soft power.

S&T has played a significant role in US foreign policy most visibly since the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, and the prominence of S&T in the country's foreign policy has grown remarkably over the decades. Subsequent US administrations have relied on the use of S&T to advance key US foreign policy goals such as forging closer ties with other states through scientific engagement and gaining greater access to emerging trends in global technology. S&T has also enabled the country to pursue inter-state rivalries, make hard power interventions and counter asymmetrical threats. Progress in S&T is seen by the country's leadership as essential to achieve the national objectives of innovation, security and prosperity.

However, there are many challenges that may prove to be detrimental to US S&T capability and, in turn, its ability to effectively use S&T as an element of foreign policy. These include rise of information warfare; challenges from rising powers, rouge states, and rivals; unfavorable policy shifts; deficiencies in the primary and secondary education system; increased restrictions on immigration; and prevalence of social inequalities.

It is against this backdrop that this study seeks to examine the role of science and technology in foreign policy of the United States of America. The study begins by briefly investigating the evolution of S&T in US foreign policy from the early days to the 20th century. A review of the trends and policies of the 21st century is then made. Key challenges which may impede the role of S&T in US foreign policy are briefly outlined. Concluding remarks are provided after a careful analysis of the evidence at hand.

 
Evolution of Science and Technology in US Foreign Policy
 
On March 23, 2015 US President Barack Obama — in a speech made at the White House — remarked that "Technological discovery helped us become the world’s greatest economic power. Scientific and medical breakthroughs helped us become the greatest source of hope around the world. And that’s not just our past, that’s also our future." Attributing the success of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) in the country to the efforts of young scientists, Obama reaffirmed his administration's support towards promoting STEM education, research and infrastructure (Obama 2015).

The US has a long and distinguished history of promoting S&T both within the country and as a part of its foreign policy. Early American statesmen Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson — regarded to be among the Founding Fathers of the country — have also been described by Stine (2009: 1) 'as the nation’s first scientific diplomats.' The idea of Scientific Internationalism — that of using international scientific collaboration to build partnerships aimed at securing greater peace and prosperity — has a long history, and the US itself promoted global cooperation in various fields of S&T across international organizations such as the League of Nations and the International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation during the first half of the 20th Century (Miller 2006).

However, the clearest credible antecedent to many US government bodies aimed at promoting S&T as a part of American foreign policy remains the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation set up under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who served in office from March 4, 1933 until his death on April 12, 1945. The Committee provided practical US technical assistance to states in Latin America, and specialized in diverse fields of S&T ranging from statistics to marine sciences. The role of the Committee would go on to include technical assistance to Europe and Asia during the aftermath of the Second World War. The Committee, which ultimately gave way to more specialist organizations for the promotion of S&T in foreign policy by the 1950s, laid the foundations of practical scientific engagement between the US and the rest of the world (Miller 2006).

During the Second World War and the post war period, the US was globally viewed as a great power partially due to its proven track record of using S&T in areas such as military technology, including nuclear weapons technology. In the post Second World War era, credible competition arose in form of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which had a sophisticated S&T apparatus of its own for achieving domestic and foreign policy objectives. However, even during one of the most intense enduring rivalries in modern history, both the US and Soviet leaderships had shown some vision and will to bilaterally cooperate through various fields related to S&T (Skolnikoff 1967).

In a speech delivered on December 8, 1953 US President Dwight D. Eisenhower made a proposal to jointly allocate fissionable material to a neutral international body to 'serve peaceful pursuits of mankind' such as generation of electricity through nuclear energy in 'the power-starved areas of the world' (Eisenhower 1953, quoted in Skolnikoff 1967: 24-25). Eisenhower's calls for closer S&T cooperation — including his letters to Russian Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin and Premier Nikita Khrushchev — received a cold and skeptical response from the Soviet leadership in Moscow, which was alarmed at the prospect of having American nuclear missiles close to its border, and emboldened by the progress made by Russian scientists, particularly in the field of space exploration (Sagdeev 2008).

President John F. Kennedy — who succeeded Eisenhower on January 20, 1961 — was more successful in ensuring some degree of cooperation with America's socialist rival through the means of S&T. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 20, 1963 Kennedy lamented the need for competition with the USSR in the area of space exploration and suggested that countries around the world work together for achieving aims and objectives of common interest in the field of outer space (Kennedy 1963, quoted in Skolnikoff 1967: 23). Thaw in US-Russia S&T ties began to emerge after Kennedy made repeated and persistent attempts at initiating cooperation with the Soviet Union in the field of space exploration, and Moscow responded positively to his outreach. In 1962, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden and Russian space scientist Anatoli Blagonravov led talks that resulted in early US-Russian cooperation in applied scientific research related to outer space, particularly in the fields of meteorology, geomagnetic field and communications (Sagdeev 2008).

The US-USSR relationship — and that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact factions — was marked with a high degree of aggressive competition originating due to discordant ideologies and competing interests. This Cold War would continue until the fall of the USSR in 1991. But throughout the Cold War the US and the USSR were also able to achieve some precious measure of cooperation through the means of S&T. Despite going through periods of severe hostility such as the Cuban Missile Crisis the two countries also managed to pursue joint programs in the field of applied S&T most notably exemplified by the Apollo–Soyuz Test Project in 1975 (Sagdeev 2008).

Throughout the Cold War, US capability to lead the world in many areas of S&T also brought positive international attention that resulted in greater American engagement with foreign states. By the 1960s, NASA had emerged as a powerful institution in US foreign policy, and by 1965 NASA had managed to forge international scientific collaboration with sixty-nine countries. This engagement ensured greater international awareness and appreciation for the US space program in comparison to its more secretive Soviet counterpart, which had an opaque bureaucratic culture unique to socialist states of the era (Skolnikoff 1967, Sagdeev 2008).

During the Cold War, the US also managed to find areas of mutual interest with other states — including those which did not fully support its policies — by employing S&T in its own foreign policy. Also, by the Cold War era US universities, particularly those specializing in the field of S&T, gained significant international recognition. Even countries such as India and Iran — which lacked any considerable measure of pro-US sentiment during the Cold War — sought to learn from, and replicate, the success of American universities such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) with varying degrees of success (Leslie and Kargon 2006).

The US further deployed its formidable scientific prowess in areas such as agriculture and meteorology to forge working partnerships with counties around the world, assisting countries such as India achieve national objectives such as Green Revolution by lending valuable technical assistance (Doel and Harper 2006). The role of the US private sector in R&D related to science, technology and innovation also witnessed a steady growth during the Cold War era, and private sector R&D spending exceeded that made by the public sector for the first time in 1980 (National Science Board 2004, cited in West 2011).

After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the US emerged as the world's most powerful country. A sound economy and a high degree of sophistication in military technology led to significant gains in hard-power interventions, most notably during the First Gulf War in Iraq and the Kosovo War (Paarlberg 2004). In both these instances and others, technologically superior US led coalitions were able to defeat numerically superior adversaries in conventional warfare, furthering US security and foreign policy objectives in distant regions.

The role of S&T in post-Cold War US foreign policy revolved around five major and mutually-reinforcing tenets according to a report on science, technology and American diplomacy prepared jointly by the Office of the President of the United States of America; United States House Committee on Science; United States House Committee on International Relations in 1996 during the Bill Clinton administration. These five tenets were Building Democracy; Promoting and Maintaining Peace; Promoting Economic Growth and Sustainable Development; Addressing Global Problems; and Providing Humanitarian Assistance.


Science and Technology in US Foreign Policy: The 21st century

US pre-eminence in terms of S&T continued into the 21st century and continues to this day. In the 21st century, the US has maintained a commanding lead over allies and adversaries alike in terms of research papers published by its scientists. Scholarly and academic output originating from the US in the various fields pertaining to S&T has also consistently been the highest in the world in terms of citations in academic sources. Both the public and private sectors in the US have sought to maintain the country's hard power advantage by investing substantially in defense R&D. As a result, the country manages to maintain a convincing lead over potential rivals such as China in key S&T areas such as military technology, microelectronics, information technology, nuclear technology and space (Paarlberg 2004, National Science Board 2016).

Advancements in technology have also resulted in yielding soft power dividends for the country. Owing partially to its world-renowned university system, which has long attracted more international students than any other country, and its iconic private sector technology organizations — such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Microsoft — the country was ranked 3 out of 30 in Portland Communication's annual Soft Power 30 index in 2017.

​On March 3, 2014 US President Barack Obama addressed the press from the White House along with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel in a brief interaction. Speaking on the issue of US response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict over Crimea, President Obama stated that if Moscow continued on its 'current trajectory' then his administration would consider a 'series of steps' meant to 'isolate Russia' and degrade its economic and global status as retaliation. He confirmed that a number of punitive measures had already been discussed between him and Secretary of State John Kerry, and further showed a willingness to provide assistance to Ukraine.

However, Russia and its local allies managed to hold a highly contentious referendum in Crimea on March 16, 2014 in order to determine the status and future of the disputed region. The referendum — in which the verdict was heavily tilted towards Crimea joining the Russian Federation — was criticized by many states and international organizations as being unfair and illegal. The US and its allies responded with a series of sanctions within 48 hours of the referendum result and began to operationalize a policy of isolating Russia.

Since then the number of sanctions levied by the US and its allies on Russia and individuals and organizations sympathetic to Moscow have only grown in number and severity. To further exacerbate things, Russia's entry into the Syrian conflict on behest of the Bashar al-Assad administration has further alienated the West. Moscow supports the Syrian government — and opposes the US backed 'moderate rebels' fighting against the government forces. The US and its European allies are considering further sanctions against Russia, and calls for engagement with Moscow are gradually giving in to those calling for a more hard-line approach.

Since there have recently been fervent calls for using even more sanctions as means to put an end to the perceived Russian 'belligerence' it would be worthy to find out if the extensive labyrinth of sanctions levied on Moscow thus far have had any noticeable success in 'isolating Russia'. This article thus seeks to examine Washington's 'Isolate Russia' approach.

On October 15 of this year, Russia and India concluded their annual summit on the sidelines of a BRICS meeting in Goa, India. The two sides signed a number of bilateral agreements worth billions of dollars covering such sensitive areas as defense, energy, space, logistics and information technology in Goa. The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi invoked an old Russian saying and remarked that 'an old friend is better than two new friends' while addressing a visibly cheerful Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The bonhomie in Goa will not come as a surprise to long-time observers of the traditionally friendly ties between India and Russia. India's National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon recognized that Russia had 'legitimate interests' in Ukraine even before the controversial referendum in Crimea was held. Furthermore, the first foreign visit of Sergey Aksyonov — head of the partially recognized government of the Republic of Crimea — was to New Delhi.

However, the limits of the 'Isolate Russia' approach have become much more apparent in recent times as countries such as Israel, Turkey and Japan — considered as traditional allies of the US — have quietly initiated their own diplomatic measures to forge closer ties with Moscow despite being in full knowledge of the stance taken by the Obama administration.

In a visible setback to the US led efforts to isolate Russia, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met Russian President Putin on August 9 of this year during his first foreign visit after successfully having quelled a coup attempt, an act for which he enjoyed Moscow's support despite the diplomatic misgivings that followed in the aftermath of the downing of a Russian Su 24 in Syria by the Turkish Air Force in November 2015. Turkey's outreach to Russia came at a time when many Turkish leaders blamed the US and the EU for not doing enough to support the incumbent AKP administration during the coup attempt and its aftermath. The Turkish President was received favorably by the Russian side during the meeting and a gradual normalization of relations was agreed upon, including a resumption of trade and travel ties.

Japan — another US ally — has also been pursuing a path towards calibrated normalization and rapprochement with Russia. After a meeting in Vladivostok in early September of this year the two sides agreed to enhance ties and work towards a peaceful solution of outstanding territorial disputes. Not only is there substance to the recent warmth in Russia-Japan ties but Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has actually been pushing for an entire 'eight point economic cooperation plan' with Russia, the progress of which he wished should be reviewed jointly at the highest levels by both states on an annual basis. Although an assertive China may have contributed to Tokyo's new approach to engage Moscow the approach of engagement itself results in mitigating Russia's isolation to a significant measure.

Israel has also been pursuing a policy of engagement with Russia recently on a level that is unprecedented for the two countries. Damien Sharkov, while writing for Newsweek, observes the many visits that the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made to Moscow since the fall of 2015. During a recent visit by Prime Minister Netanyahu to Moscow the Israeli statesman remarked that when it came to fighting terrorism the two countries were 'unconditional allies'. Speaking from the Kremlin, Netanyahu further remarked that 'Israel’s doors are open to Russia and Russia’s doors are open to Israel'. It would bear repetition that President Obama first made his intention to 'isolate Russia' known to the public from the White House in the presence of Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Russia's ties with individual member states of the BRICS grouping, including China, are also warm but — with the exception of India — they do not border on the verge on alliances. There are several other states which have a declared agenda of pursuing closer ties with Russia and these include regional Asian powers such as Iran, Philippines and Pakistan. Overall, it is clearly discernible that despite strenuous efforts to isolate Russia by the US and its European allies in light of differences over Crimea and Syria the strategy does not seem to be yielding its intended effect, and limitations of such a strategy have recently begun to surface openly.

This inference is in no manner intended to suggest that the US and its allies do not have legitimate grievances against Moscow or are not entitled to use their leverages in the international system against a state which they see as pursuing a course that is averse to their collective interests. However, it is the efficacy of such an approach that is questionable. If the sanctions and other manoeuvres were intended to bring about an end to the perceived Russian 'belligerence' they have clearly not succeeded in their purpose.

In fact, between the time of the first sanctions being levied to the date of publishing of this article Russia has put its formidable S-300 surface-to-air missile defense system in Iran; allegedly interfered with its cyber-warfare tools in the 2016 United States presidential election campaigns; carried on with its support to the Assad administration in Syria; and sent a formidable grouping of its navy ships through the English channel. The ongoing sanctions may have succeeded in bringing the Russian economy to its knees and creating hardships for the ordinary civilian population but it appears that they have certainly failed in their stated objective of bringing an end to Russia's 'belligerent behavior'.

Russia remains as one of the most powerful states in the Twenty First Century, and is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The country is a formidable military power at air, land and sea, and further possess a diverse array of sophisticated nuclear weapons. Given a large and vibrant diaspora as well as fully functional media outlets such as Russia Today (RT) it is not entirely devoid of soft power either.

The 'Isolate Russia' approach may also have to contend with further limitations due to a rise in multi-polarity and a gradual decline in US influence. This does not necessarily mean that the US is under threat of losing its place as the sole superpower in the international system. But it does mean that more US allies may have significantly more reason for choosing their own alliances in the international system according to their individual national interest than before, even if decision-makers in Washington, DC may wish otherwise.

Moscow has been able to overcome isolation due to a series of changes in external environment and on the basis its own state power. There is need for a rethink in US strategy and a case for deeper engagement as an alternative policy can also be made in this regard. However, there are constraints that may impede a policy of sustainable engagement in bilateral relations. It is well known that both sides have competing ideas for the international system, and their own place in it. How the US adjusts its Russia policy in a global environment under which voices from Moscow are increasingly being heard will be worth following.

Manoj Saxena is the Editor of South Asia News Review.